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In recent years policy makers, politicians and academics have become deeply 
concerned about the future of social security.  The specter of a massive insolvency crisis 
has generated, throughout the world, a frantic search for a solution to what the World 
Bank has called the “old age crisis.” Conferences have been organized, wise-men groups 
have been assembled, and blueprints for reform have been discussed.  Throughout this 
process, and in an effort to learn from lessons of experience, many analysts have focused 
on Chile’s pioneering social security reform.  In 1980 Chile replaced an insolvent 
government-run social security system, by a privately managed system based on 
individual retirement accounts.   Almost twenty years after the launching of this 
privatization effort, the Chilean experience has become a required case study for anyone 
interested in reforming social security.
1 Most analyses of Chile’s experience have 
concentrated on three aspects of this privatization program:  (1)  Its effect on the fiscal 
accounts, including its effect on public sector’s contingent liabilities.  (2) The effects of 
the new system on old-age pensions, including a comparison of replacement rates under 
the old a new regime.  And (3) the effects of the reform on aggregate national savings.
2   
Surprisingly, very few studies of the Chilean episode have dealt with the overall 
labor market implications of the social security reforms.  This, however, is not unique of 
the Chilean case.  In fact, while a number of studies for a variety of countries have 
analyzed the way in which social security systems affect labor market incentives for older 
individuals, very few authors have analyzed formally the way in which a major social 
security reform affects overall labor market outcomes.
3  And yet, it may be argued that a 
reform that (in principle) changes the rate of payroll taxes, and affects the relationship  3
between social security contributions and future earnings will have substantial effects on 
the aggregate and (sectoral) demand and supply for labor.  This would be clearly the case 
if contributions to the pay-as-you go system are considered (at least in part) a tax, and 
contributions to individual retirement accounts are seen largely as deferred 
compensation.
4   
The privatization of social security – either partially or fully – is likely to have a 
particularly significant effect on overall labor markets outcomes in emerging economies, 
including in former socialist nations.  Most emerging countries are characterized by 
segmented labor markets, where a modern and an informal labor market coexist.  Under 
these circumstances, only those employed in the “modern” segment will be covered by 
labor market regulations, including social security.  Those employed in the so-called 
informal sector work without formal contracts, generally do not pay taxes, are not 
affected by minimum wages laws, and are excluded from the formal safety net. 
  The purpose of this paper is to analyze the way in which a social security reform 
of the Chilean-type affects labor market outcomes in an economy characterized by a 
segmented labor market.  Our main interest is to evaluate the way in which Chile’s social 
security reform affected the country’s level of employment, its rate of unemployment and 
wages.  In order to do this we develop a model of the labor market in an emerging 
economy, and we simulate it using parameter values for Chile.  We also use micro survey 
data to investigate some key features, such as coverage, of Chile’s privatized social 
security system. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section I is the introduction.  In Section II we 
provide a brief evaluation of Chile’s social security reform.  Section III deals with the  4
effects of social security reform on wages, income distribution, employment and 
unemployment.  The section begins with a general discussion of Chile’s labor market 
reforms.  We next develop a model of a segmented labor market to analyze the way in 
which policies aimed at reducing the tax component of social security contribution affect 
the key labor market variables.  In section IV we use micro survey data to obtain an 
estimate of the “tax component” of social security contributions under Chile’s privately 
managed social security system.
5 We then use, in Section V, the results from this 
empirical analysis to simulate our model, and compute the effects of Chile’s social 
security reform on employment, unemployment and wages.  The results from our 
simulation exercise suggest that the effect of the reform on Chile’s aggregate 
employment was rather modest.  The results also suggest that the reforms resulted in a 
small increase in average wages.  Finally, in section VI we provide some concluding 
remarks. 
 
II.    The Privatization of Chile’s Social Security System 
In late 1980 Chile’s military regime privatized the country’s traditional pay-as-
you-go social security system.
6  Twenty years after Chile’s social security reform, most 
observers agree that Chile’s program was a true pioneer, and that there is much to learn 
from it.  In this section we provide a brief discussion of the main aspects of the reform..
7 
II.1  The Old Pay-as-you-go System 
Chile’s original social security system was designed in the 1920s as a 
collective capitalization fund.  Accumulated funds, however, were poorly managed, and 
benefits -- especially for the better to do -- escalated quickly. For all practical purposes,  5
and in spite of the original intentions of its founders, by the 1970s the system had become 
an insolvent pay-as-you-go regime, characterized by very high contribution rates.  In 
1973, for example, total contributions to the retirement plan -- by employers and 
employees -- averaged 26 percent of wages.  Once contributions to the national health 
system were included, total contributions exceeded, for some workers, 50 percent of 
wages.  What made things worse was that there was almost no connection between 
retirement contributions and (perceived) benefits.  Contributions were largely seen as 
taxes, while benefits received from the social security system were seen as entitlements.
8 
While in 1955 there were 12 active contributors per retiree, by 1979 there were 
only 2.5.  As a result of this, and of a highly inefficient management, the Chilean system 
became increasingly unfunded.  By the early 1970s the system as a whole was already 
running a dramatic deficit.  The gap between revenues and outlays -- administrative costs 
plus pensions -- was made up by the public sector.  By 1971 the central government’s 
contributions to the retirement system amounted to almost 3% of GDP, and the present 
valued of the system’s contingent liabilities exceeded 100% of GDP. 
II.2  The Privatization of Social Security in Chile 
In 1980 the military privatized the social security system.  The core of Chile’s 
new privately managed system are individual retirement accounts managed by private 
companies known as “Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones”, AFPs.  A key feature 
of the system is that it is mandatory for individuals working for a formal employee.  
Participants can freely decide which AFP will manage their retirement funds, and are free 
to transfer them across the different management firms.  Upon reaching the minimum 
pensionable age, individuals can choose to buy an annuity, or to withdraw their funds  6
according to a predetermined (actuarially fair) plan.
9  The system also has a survivor’s 
term life insurance component, and a disability program funded with an additional 
insurance premium.  In the reformed system, the State continues to play an important 
role.  It regulates and monitors the operation of the management companies, and 
guarantees a minimum pension
10. In an effort to increase the attractiveness of the new 
system, and in order to reduce political opposition, contribution rates under the new 
system were lowered;  as a result, those individuals that joined the new system 
experienced an average increase of net take-home pay equal to10%.
11 It was expected 
that, given the anticipated higher rates of return on the accumulated funds, the lower 
contributions would be enough to finance higher replacement rates for pensions. 
Contributions to the retirement component of the system are equal to 10% of 
income, considerably lower then the 26% (on average) under the old system.  Total 
contributions for retirement, health and survivorship insurance add up to 20% of wages, 
with a cap equivalent to an annual wage rate of US$40,000 per year.  A detailed 
regulatory framework -- enforced by an institution especially created for this purpose, the 
Superintendency of AFPs -- regulates investment portfolios, ensures free determination 
of fees and commissions and free entry into the industry. Until 2000, each AFP could 
manage only one retirement fund; likewise, each participant could have only one 
retirement account. 
Self employed workers are not required to participate in the system.  They have 
the choice, however, to set voluntary retirement accounts which are (basically) subject to 
the same regulations as those of formal sector employees.  In 1998 the percentage of 
active contributors – that is those making deposits into their retirement accounts --stood  7
at 58% of total employment, with an additional 4% of workers still contributing to the old 
system.  This means, then, that in 1998 the total coverage of the Chilean retirement 
system amounted to 62% of employment.  The 38% that is not covered by the social 
security system corresponds, largely, to those that work in the informal sector, or to the 
self employed (for details on the actual characteristics of those not covered by the new 
system, see the discussion in section III of this paper).  At 62% of employment, the 
current coverage of the system is similar to that of the old pay-as-you-go system.   
The volume of pension funds privately managed by the AFPs has increased 
dramatically.   Between 1985 and 1997 they increased from 10% of GDP to almost 45% 
of GDP.  Furthermore, recent simulations suggest that by year 2010 the accumulated 
funds will represent 110% of GDP, and that by 2020 they would have reached 134% of 
GDP.
12  The type of assets the retirement funds can invest in are tightly regulated.  
During the early years, funds were largely restricted to government securities, bank 
deposits, investment grade corporate bonds and mortgage bonds.  At this time, however, 
a number of equities, both domestic and foreign, are allowed.  
During the early years of the reform the real (inflation adjusted) average rate of 
return of accumulated funds was very high, averaging during 1982-1995, 12.8 percent per 
annum.  More recently, however, the real rate of return has declined significantly, and has 
averaged, between September 1994 and August 2000 the (real) rate of return for the 
system was 4.9%.  This rate is rather low, and has raised some people’s concerns about 
the system’s ability to deliver pensions with a relatively high replacement rate in the 
future.  8
Existing regulations impose a floor on the return individual AFP pay to their 
members.  In any given year an AFP cannot pay a return lower than 2 percentage points 
of the system’s average.  If the actual return of a particular AFP falls below this 
minimum, the difference has to be made up by using funds from a specially set “reserve 
fund.”  The restriction on a minimum rate of return, coupled with the regulations that 
each AFP cannot have more than one fund, and that individuals cannot distribute their 
funds across funds, reduced the extent of competition of the system, and resulted in the 
different AFPs holding extremely similar portfolios.  Reforms introduced in 2000, 
however, have allowed each AFP to have a second fund. 
The new system allows men to draw a pension at 65, and women at 60, or earlier 
if they have accumulated enough funds to finance a pension of 70 percent of their 
(pensionable) salary.  When an individual retires he can choose between two systems:  
(A)  he can use the accumulated funds to buy an annuity from an insurance company;  or,  
(B)  he can chose to enroll in a “programmed withdrawal” scheme, where the 
accumulated funs are drawn according to an actuarially determined schedule. By 1997 
there were already 250,000 retirees receiving pensions under the new system.  Of these, 
approximately one half had opted for annuities, and one half for programmed withdrawal.  
Using a sample of 4,064 individuals, it has been estimated that the average replacement 
rate under the new system had amounted to 78%, significantly higher than under the old 
pay-as-you-go regime.
13  
The new system also establishes that, for those individuals that qualify, there is a 
minimum pension guaranteed by the state, which as of December 1998 was equal to 85% 
of the minimum wage.  From an international comparative perspective, replacement rates  9
have been quite high in Chile – indeed higher than under most industrialized countries’ 
systems.
14  
II.3 Transitional Costs and Weaknesses of the New System 
Most proposals to privatize social security, struggle with issues related to the 
transition.  Chile dealt with this problem in a simple, and costly manner.  All transitional 
costs were borne by the government and were paid out of the general budget. Individuals 
that had been contributing to the old system received government bonds – the so-called 
“recognition bonds”.  These bonds yielded per annum 4% in inflation adjusted terms, an 
were placed in the each individual retirement account.  The value of the bonds received 
by each person was determined using a formula that took into account their history of 
contributions to the old system.  From a fiscal point of view the transition was rather 
expensive, representing almost 5%of GDP in the peak year of 1983.  It is estimated that 
by 2015 these costs would have almost disappeared. 
The privatized Chilean system has exhibited two important weaknesses:  First, at 
62% of workers, the level of total coverage of the new system is low.  This is explained 
by two basic factors: first, the self-employed – which are not legally required to 
participate in the system-- have limited incentives to make voluntary contributions.  
Second, the existence of a government-guaranteed (universal) minimum pension creates a 
moral hazard situation among low income workers, many of which are self employed.   
For these individuals it pays to contribute only sporadically, and only enough as to obtain 
the minimum pension once they retire.
15  Second, the cost of running the private system – 
in terms of fees, commissions and, especially, marketing costs – has been very high,  10
tending to exceed, during the last few years, 10% of contributions.  This has resulted in a 
significant reduction of the net rate of return accrued to participants.
16 
II.4  Chile’s Social Security and Labor Market Reforms 
The reform of social security was only one component of a broad effort to 
transform Chile into a modern market economy.  During the second half of the 1970s the 
military government implemented a number of fundamental reforms, including a major 
overhaul of the tax system, the opening up of the economy to international competition, 
the privatization of most state owned enterprises, and the creation of a modern financial 
market.  In the early 1980’s the scope of the reforms was broadened to include labor 
markets and social security.   
In 1979, and under considerable international pressure, the military government 
initiated an effort to reform Chile’s labor legislation.  The main objectives of these 
policies were:  (a)  To reform job security legislation, by limiting the extent of severance 
payments.  These were reduced form  “one month per year of service, with no limit”, to 
“one month per year of service, with a 5 months limit.”  (b)  To reduce unions’ power by 
decentralizing collective bargaining, and eliminating the old “close-shop” practice. And 
(c), reduce payroll taxes.  This last measure was to be achieved, partially, by the social 
security reform, discussed above.
17 
Between 1985 and 1997, Chile’s labor markets performed well.
18  What makes 
this experience particularly interesting is that between 1983-85 and 1993-95, Chile went 
from rates of unemployment usually associated with some European countries, to 
unemployment rates similar to those traditionally prevailing in the U.S.  While during 
1983-85 the open rate of unemployment averaged 17.3%, by 1993-95 it had declined to  11
5.8 percent.  And all of this while real wages experienced rates of growth in excess of 5% 
per year.
19  An interesting question is which of the components of the labor-related 
reforms – the reduced degree of job security, the reformed collective bargaining, or the 
social security reform -- were more important in helping Chile improve its labor market 
performance.  Although providing a full answer to this question is beyond the scope of 
this paper, in section III we develop a model that allow us to quantify the effect of the 
social security reform on some of the key labor market variables.  We proceed as follows: 
we first develop (in Section III) a model of segmented labor market, and investigate the 
way in which changes in taxes on labor in the “covered or modern” sector impact labor 
market outcomes.  Next, in Section IV, we use micro survey data to analyze the extent to 
which participants considered the new system as a “deferred compensation” scheme.  
Finally, in Section V, we calibrate and simulate the model for the case of Chile.  Our 
findings suggest that the social security reform had a modest effect on Chile’s labor 
market performance.  This, however, needs not be the case in other countries: the actual 
impact of a Chile-style social security reform on unemployment, wages and income 
distribution will depend on the specific values of the relevant parameters. 
 
IV.  A Model of Social Security Reform and Labor Markets 
In this section we develop a two-sector model to analyze the effects of a social 
security reform on employment, unemployment and wages.  Labor markets in emerging 
economies in general – and in Chile, in particular –, have a number of institutional 
features that set them apart from labor markets in industrial nations.  The most important 
among these features are:  12
•  In emerging countries labor markets are usually characterized by a rather large 
“informal” segment.  This segment is, de facto, not directly affected by labor market 
regulations, such as minimum wages, job security legislation or social security.  The 
informal sector coexists with a “modern” sector, where labor market regulations are 
fully in effect.  The fact that in Chile the social security system covers only 62% of 
those employed, provides some evidence of the existence of this segmented 
structure.
20  
•  Contributions to social security are often seen as a (partial) tax on labor, rather than as 
deferred compensation, or an insurance program.  At the same time, benefits from 
these programs are seen by individuals as an entitlement.  The percentage of the 
contribution that is actually considered a pure tax depends on the nature of the social 
security system and, more specifically, on the perceived connection between 
contributions and benefits.
21  
Formally, assume that, as is the case in many developing and transitional economies, 
the labor market is segmented.  There is a “modern” or “covered” sector subject to a 
minimum wage and to social security coverage, and an “informal” or “unprotected” 
sector with no social security coverage, and competitively determined wages.  With other 
things equal, workers will rather be employed in the “protected” sector.  The problem, 
however, is that there are not enough jobs in that sector; individuals that apply for a job in 
the modern sector face a probability (p) of obtaining it, and a probability (1-p) of being 
unemployed.  In equilibrium, and under the assumption of risk neutrality, the wage rate 
obtained in the informal segment is equal to the expected (take home) wage rate in the 
protected sector.  We further assume that every period employment in the modern sector  13
turns over fully, so that the probability of getting a job in that sector is equal to the ratio 
of openings to applicants.
22 
We assume that prior to the reform workers in the protected sector are subject to a 
payroll tax – whose purpose is to fund the social security system—equal to T1.  We also 
assume that there is a disconnect between social security contributions and benefits.  
More specifically, we assume that social security contributions are considered by 
individuals to be fully a tax.  Notice, however, that the analysis that follows would not be 
affected by the assumption that only a fraction of the contribution was considered to be a 
tax.  Workers employed in the modern sector receive a “take home” wage rate equal to 
the minimum wage (Wmin ).  The cost of labor to firms operating in this sector is equal to 
the minimum wage plus the payroll tax.  The social security reform will result in a 
reduction of this tax.  There are two sources for this reduction:  first, as was the case in 
Chile, the reform itself may entail a reduction in the contribution.  Second, the 
replacement of the old pay-as-you-go system by individual retirement accounts, reduces 
the disconnect between contributions and benefits.  In the post reform period, at least part 
of the contribution will be considered as deferred compensation (see Section IV for an 
estimate for the case of Chile.) 
Equations (1) - (4) describe the wage determination process in this economy.  
Equation (1) establishes that in equilibrium the wage rate in the informal sector (WI) is 
equal to the expected (net of taxes) wage rate in the modern sector E (W 
N 
M).  According 
to equation (2) the probability of finding a job in the modern sector is equal to the ratio of 
openings – that is employment in that sector (L M) – to applicants.  The latter is given by 
the sum of openings (L M ) plus the total number of unemployed (U).  It is assumed, for  14
simplicity, that the unemployed received an income equal to S.  Equation (3) says that the 
cost of labor in the modern sector is equal to the minimum wage inclusive of the payroll 
tax ( T1).  In equation (4) we present the demand for labor equations in the modern and 
informal sectors.  P M and P I are good prices in each sector, the functions f (  ) and g (  ) 
are physical marginal productivity of labor.  K M and K I are the stock of capital used in 
the modern and informal sector, respectively. 
 
(1)     WI = E (W 
N 
M) = p Wmin + (1 – p) S 
(2)     p  = [LM / (LM + U)] 
(3)     W  M = W min (1 + T 1) 
(4)     W  M = P M f (L M , K M );   W I = P I  g (L I, K I ). 
 
Equation (5) is the resource constraint in the labor market, and establishes that 
employment in the modern sector, plus employment in the informal sector plus 
unemployment has to be equal to total labor supply (L s).  According to equation (6), 
labor supply is a positive function of real wages; O represents “other” factors affecting 
the supply of labor.
23   Equation (7) define the aggregate price index and the aggregate 
wage rate, as geometric means of sectoral prices and wages, respectively.  In order to 
simplify the analysis, in equation (8) we have assumed that the modern sector 
corresponds to tradable goods and that, as a consequence, P M is given by international 
prices (P*M).
24  Equation (9) establishes that product prices in the informal sector are a 
positive function of wages in that sector.  We further assume that an increase in W I, will  15
have a less than proportional effect on prices of goods produced in the informal sector.  
That is, d log P I < d log W I. 
   
(5)     L  M + L I + U = L S 
(6)     L  S = h (W/P,O);   h’ > 0. 
(7)     P  =  P  I 
β  P M 
( 1 - β ) ;   W = W I 
θ  W M 
( 1 - θ )  
(8)     P  M = P*M
 ;   
(9)     P  I   =  z (W I);    z’ > 0;  d log P I < d log W I. 
 
Equation (10) is the resource constraint for capital, and says that the sum of 
capital used in each sector has to equal the total stock of capital.  Equation (11) says that 
the allocation of the capital stock across sectors will depend on the relative product 
prices.  Notice that in order to simplify the computations, and to focus on  the issues at 
hand, we have assumed that there is no net investment. 
 
(10)     K  M + K I  = K 
(11)     K M = j (P M/P I);  K I  = v (P M/P I). 
 
The initial (pre reform) labor market is depicted in Figure 1, under the simplifying 
assumption that the unemployed get no assistance (S = 0).  Distance O M - O I  is total 
labor supply, L M  and L I  are the demand for labor schedules, and yy is a rectangular 
hyperbola, that satisfies the equilibrium condition in equation (1).  The wage rate and the 
level of employment in the informal sector are determined by the intersection of the yy  16
and L I schedules. W min is the minimum wage which, as stated above, is assumed to be 
set in net take-home bases. T 1 is the payroll tax, and W M is the cost of labor in the 
modern sector.  W I is the wage rate in the informal sector.  The initial level of 
employment in the modern sector is given by distance O M – L M 
1
;  distance O I – L I 
1
  
depicts initial employment in the informal sector.  The total number of unemployed is 
equal to distance L M 
1
 – L I 
1
 .  As pointed out earlier, we consider the case where the 
reform reduces the (perceived) tax component of social security contributions.  That is, 
we assume that as a result of the social security reform, there will be a reduction of T1, to 
some lower level, possibly even to zero.  This would unleash a series of effects, including 
a higher demand for labor in the modern sector, a change in aggregate labor supply, and 
changes in wages and in employment in the informal sector. 
Formally, the model given by equations (1) - (11) can be solved to obtain the 
effects of this type of social security reform, on a number of variables, including informal 
sector wages (W I), the volume of unemployment (U), and product prices of in the 
informal sector (P I).  In order to simplify the exposition, we follow a long tradition in 
international trade theory – the Ricardo-Viner approach – and we assume that capital is 
fixed in its sector of origin. We begin with the effects of changes in the tax component of 
the social security contribution (d log T) on informal sector wages (d log WI): 
 
(12)         d log W I =  ∆ 
-1 { - [α U ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η M )]  




(13)        ∆  =  - α U  -  [α I  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η I  )  ( µ - 1 )]  
-  [( U / ( L M + U )) φ  (α I  + µ β ) ].  
 
α I , α M  and α U  are the shares of employment in the informal sector, employment in the 
modern sector, and unemployment in the labor resources constraint (5). η I and η M are 
the inverse of the elasticities of the demand for labor with respect to wages in the I and M 
sectors, respectively, and are negative.
25  φ  is the supply elasticity of labor, and is 
positive. µ is the elasticity of the price of informal sector goods (PI) with respect to the 
wage rate in that sector, and is greater than zero and smaller than one.  It follows from 
equation (13), then, that ∆ is negative.  Consequently, according to equation (12), the 
following result holds: 
 
(d log W I / d log T) < 0. 
 
This means that a social security reform that reduces the payroll tax, will unambiguously 
generate an increase in the wage rate in the informal sector I, the sector that is not 
covered by the by the social security system, and that prior to the reform had the lowest 
wage rate.  Notice that, by construction, net (take home) wages in the modern sector are 
not affected by the reform.  This is because we have assumed that the minimum wage is 
set in take-home bases, and that the reform does not affect it.  The more general case 
where the reform generates an increase in net wages in the M sector is discussed below. 
  The effect of the reform on aggregate unemployment (U), is given by:  18
 
(14)   d log U =  ∆ 
-1 { (α I  / η I ) -  [α I  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η I  ) ( 1 / η M  ) ( µ - 1 )]  
   -  [( U / ( L M + U )) φ  (α I  + µ β ) ( 1 / η M  )]} (T 1 / (1+T1))  d log T. 
  
The sign of equation (14) is undetermined.  It follows from this that within the 
framework developed in this paper, a reduction in the payroll tax in the modern sector 
will have an ambiguous effect on the number of unemployed.  Whether the level of 
unemployment will increase or decline will depend on two basic factors:  the supply 
elasticity of labor in the economy  -- parameter φ in equation (14) --; and the demand 
elasticity of labor demand in the informal sector.  The more elastic is the supply for labor 
and the more inelastic is the demand for labor in the informal sector, the more likely it is 
that the reform will result in an increase in the level of unemployment.   
  Equation (15) gives the effect of the reform on product prices in the informal 
sector, and is positive: 
 
(15)           d log P I =  ∆ 
-1 { - ( U / ( L M + U ))  (α M / η M )  
                                -  α U  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η M  )} ( T 1 / ( 1 + T1 ))  d log T. 
 
  The working of the model is illustrated in Figure 2, where it is assumed that the 
reform reduces the social security tax from T 1 to T 2.  The new cost of labor in the 
modern sector is WM
2.   Distance O I  - O’I is assumed to be equal to the increase in the 
amount of labor supplied to the economy.  Because of this increase in aggregate labor 
supply, the original demand for labor in the informal sector has to be redrawn as L’I.  19
Since the product price of I has increased, the demand for labor in the informal sector 
shifts up, and is represented in Figure 2 by L I
’ (PI 
1).  The wage rate in the informal 
sector is now determined by the intersection of a new rectangular hyperbola y’y’ and a 
new demand for labor in sector I, and is given by W I
2.  Employment in the informal 
sector has changed from distance O I – L I
1 to distance O I
1 – L I
2
.   Because of the 
reduction in W M, employment in the modern sector has increased from L M
1 to L M
2.  The 
new level of unemployment, which as indicated by equation (13), could be either higher 
or lower than the initial level of unemployment, is given by distance L M
2 - L I
2 . 
  The results in equations (12) – (15) assume that there is no change in the take-
home wage in the modern sector.  In Chile, however, the government mandated an 
increase in take-home wages equal to 10 percent, for those that opted for the privatized 
regime (Edwards 1998a). In the context of the model developed in this paper, an increase 
in the take-home wage in the sector covered by social security can be modeled as an 
exogenously determined increase in the minimum wage rate.  Formally speaking, then, 
this more general policy package corresponds to a situation where both the minimum 
wage (W min ) and the payroll tax, change (in opposite directions).  In this case the change 
in the wage rate in the informal sector will be given by:   
 
(16)  d log W I =  ∆ 
-1 {[ - [α U ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η M )]  
-  [( U / ( L M + U ) α M ( 1 / η M )]] { T 1 / ( 1 + T1) )  d log T  
  + d log W min }. 
 
The change in the level of employment, in turn, will now be given by:  20
 
(17)   d log U =  ∆ 
-1 { (α I  / η I ) -  [α I  ( U / ( L M + U )) ( 1 / η I  ) ( 1 / η M  ) ( µ - 1 )]  
- [( U / ( L M + U )) φ  (α I  + µ β ) ( 1 / η M  )]} {(T 1 / (1+T1))  d log T 
+   d log W min}. 
 
In this case, then, the final effect of the policy package will depend on the way in which 
the changes in the payroll tax and in the minimum wage are related to each other.  A 
reasonable assumption – and one that captures the case of the Chilean reforms – is that 
the increase in the take-home wage in the modern sector, is equal to a fraction of the 
(percentage) reduction in the payroll taxes. Under these assumptions the qualitative 
results derived above for the more simple version of the model still apply:  a social 
security reform that reduces the tax component of social security contributions will:  
  increase the wage rate in the informal sector; which is the sector with the 
lowest wages under the pay-as-you-go system; 
  will have an ambiguous effect on the level of unemployment. 
 
Notice, however, that because the effect on unemployment is ambiguous, it is not 
possible to say anything definitive with respect to the effects of the reform on income 
distribution.  In fact, it is possible that income becomes more unequally distributed as a 
result of the privatization of social security.
26 
  Although the model developed here is simple, and has some limitations, it has 
enough structure to provide insights into some of the most important effects of a pension 
reform on labor markets.
27  In Section IV we use micro survey data for 1994 to analyze  21
some important characteristics of Chile’s privatized social security system. In Section V 
we use the model developed here to simulate the effect of the social security reform on 
Chile’s labor market outcomes. 
 
IV.  Chile’s New Pension System: Who Is Covered?  How Much Do Participants 
Value The System? 
The model developed in the preceding section can be used to analyze empirically 
the effect of social security reform on labor market outcomes.  In order to calibrate and 
simulate the model, however, data on a number of key parameters are required.  These 
include:  (a) The rate of coverage of the social security system (parameter α M); (b) the 
wage elasticities of demand for labor, in the covered and uncovered sectors -- (1/η M) and 
(1/η I).  (c) The wage elasticity of supply of labor (φ); and (d), workers’ perceptions of 
the tax component of social security contributions, under both the old pay-as-you-go 
regime, and the new privatized system.   
In the case of Chile, some of these parameters (e.g. the labor elasticities) have 
been estimated in previous studies.  Other key variables, however, are not readily 
available.  In particular, there are no reliable calculations of the percentage of social 
security contributions that are considered to be a tax by labor market participants.   In 
principle, this implicit tax can be obtained by estimating a wage rate equation that include 
a “compensating differential” for individuals that participate in the social security system.  
If social security contributions are considered to be a form of deferred compensation, 
individuals that are enrolled in the system would be willing to accept, for an equivalent 
job, a lower take-home (cash) wage than those individuals that do not participate in the  22
social security system.  If, however, social security contributions are considered to be 
fully a tax, those enrolled in the system will demand, for an equivalent job, the same cash 
salary than those that are not in the system and, thus, are not subject to this tax.  The 
magnitude of the “compensating differential,” for otherwise equivalent jobs will, then, 
provide an estimate of the proportion of the contribution that is actually perceived as a 
tax by labor market participants. 
In this section we use micro data to estimate the implicit tax component of social 
security contributions. Ideally one would like to use comparable data for the pre and post 
reform era. Unfortunately, however, detailed survey data have only been collected since 
1990.  For this reason, we pursue the following strategy:  First, we use micro data from 
the post-reform period to obtain a “base estimate” for the perceived tax component of the 
privatized social security system.  Second, we make several alternative assumptions with 
respect to the perceived tax component of the old (pre-reform) system.  This allows us to 
consider an interval of possible reductions of the tax stemming from the reform. Third, 
we combine this estimated range of tax reduction with parameters obtained from other 
studies to compute, using the model developed in Section III, the effects of Chile’s social 
security’s reform on the country’s labor market.  
Our basic data set is the CASEN (Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional) 
national survey for 1994.  Using 1994 has a number of advantages.  First, it is a fairly 
“normal” year, when Chile was neither facing a recession or serious disturbances from 
abroad.   Second, it is a year when the democratic system was being consolidated, and 
thus the country was not subject to serious political disturbances.  And third, in 1994 the 
privatized social security system had already been operational for some time, and was  23
entering into a mature phase. The CASEN survey collects information on demographics, 
education, type of dwelling, health care, occupation, employment, and income, among 
other variables.  We are interested on two specific, and interrelated, questions: 
•  What is the coverage of Chile’s privatized social security system?  Or, in other 
words, what percentage of those with a paying job, make contributions to the 
system?  This is a key issue within the context of the model developed in 
Section III of this paper, where it was assumed that only a fraction of those in 
the labor market – those employed in the “formal” sector – participate in the 
social security system actively. 
•  To what extent do participants in the system  consider it a deferred 
compensation scheme?  As mentioned, we deal with this issue by estimating 
“compensating differential” wage equations.  The results from these estimates 
are used as the bases for a simulation exercise presented in section V. 
IV.1  Extent of Coverage of Chile’s  New Social Security System 
   Table 1 presents summary data, for 1994, on the coverage of Chile’s privately 
managed social security system.  These data correspond to those individuals in the 
sample that had a paying job at the time of the survey, and have been organized by urban-
rural sectors, age and gender.  “AFP” refers to the percentage of individuals in that 
particular group that made contributions to a privately managed retirement fund (an 
AFP).  “Other” refers to the percentage of individuals that made contributions to other 
retirement systems, including the old pay-as-you-go system and the armed forces 
retirement fund; “No” refers to those individuals that had not made contributions to any 
retirement system.    24
         The table is rather self-explanatory, and shows that as recently as 1994 Chile’s 
system fell considerably short of universal coverage.  Urban males have the highest 
coverage – defined as contributing to any retirement scheme --, at 69.9 percent.  The 
lowest coverage corresponds to males in the rural sector, with 47.2%.  It may also be seen 
that, with the exception of rural males, those in the 16 to 39 year-old have the highest 
degree of coverage.  For the sample as a whole, in 1994 the coverage rate of the formal 
retirement systems was 60.2%.  Data from the CASEN survey also suggest that there is a 
very high degree of compliance with respect to required contributions.  More that 95% of 
employees with an employment contract made contributions, as required by law, to a 
retirement system.  
           Although there are no comparable survey data for the pre reform period, existing 
estimates indicates that Chile’s old pay-as-you-go system covered 58% of those 
employed.  This means, then, that after the privatization reform there has only been a 
small increase in the coverage of the formal retirement system.  The fact that younger 
workers exhibit a higher coverage ratio may indicate, however, a secular trend towards 
greater participation in the system. 
IV.2  Deferred Compensation or Taxes? 
           The model developed in section III of this paper assumes that a reform of the 
social security system implies a reduction in the (implicit) tax on labor.  More 
specifically, we assume that while under the pay-as-you-go system, contributions are 
(largely) seen as taxes, under the privately managed regime contributions are seen (at 
least partially) as a deferred compensation scheme.  In this subsection we use data from  25
the CASEN survey to investigate whether, on average, individuals indeed value the new 
privatized system, and consider it as a component of their total compensation package.  
For an individual employed in the formal sector, total labor compensation will be 
equal to his take-home (cash) salary, plus a proportion of his contribution to the 
retirement system.  If contributions are fully seen as deferred compensation, that 
proportion will be equal to one.  If on the other hand, contributions are fully seen as 
taxes, that proportion will be equal to zero, and the total compensation will be only equal 
to the take-home salary.
28  In principle, then, the value attached by individuals to the 
pension system can be estimated by comparing wages from jobs that are equivalent in all 
respects, except with regard to contributions to the retirement program.  If individuals 
value being enrolled in the pension’s program, we would expect that, for otherwise 
equivalent jobs, the take-home pay of those that participate in the system will be lower 
than that of individuals that do not make contributions.  The actual difference in the 
(cash) take-home pay, for otherwise equivalent jobs, can, then, be attributed to the value 
that individuals attach to being members of the retirement system.  
We use survey data for over 23,000 individuals to estimate a “treatment” model, 
that combines a wage equation with an equation that captures the decision to contribute in 
the social security system:
29 
(18) log  w  j =  x j β + γ C j + µ j 
 
                                   1,    if  C* j    > 0 
(19) C  j   =        
                       0, otherwise  26
 
(20)    C*  j =    y j α  + ε j . 
 
Equation (18) is the wage equation.  log w j is the log of take-home wages for individual 
j; x j is a vector of traditional determinants of real wages that include, among other, 
education, experience, size of firm, gender, and geographical location of the job; C j is an 
endogenous dummy variable (i.e. the treatment variable) that takes a value of one if 
individual j participates in the retirement system, and zero if he does not. µ j is an error 
term, whose properties are discussed below. β and γ are parameters to be estimated.  The 
decision to contribute to the social security is assumed to be the result of an unobserved 
latent variable C* j, described in equation (20). C* j, in turn, is assumed to depend linearly 
on vector y j.  α is a parameters vector to be estimated, and ε j is an error term.  Error 
terms µ j and ε j are assumed to be bivariate normal, with a zero mean and a covariance 
matrix given by: 
 
         σ  ρ 
(21)          ρ 1   
 
If the wage and contribution equations are independent, the covariance term ρ in equation 
(21) will be zero.   
Parameter γ in equation (18) measures the (average) value that individuals attach 
to participating in the privatized social security system.  We expect its estimated 
coefficient to be ≤ 0.  If the (average) value attached to social security contributions is 
zero – that is, if contributions are fully considered a tax --, the estimated coefficient  27
should not be significantly different from zero.  If, on the other hand, contributions are 
considered to be fully a deferred form of compensation, we would expect the estimated 
coefficient γ to be approximately equal to the rate of contribution.   
  The model given by equations (18) - (20) can be estimated simultaneously using a 
maximum likelihood procedure.   Chile’s specific institutional arrangements, however, 
complicate somewhat the task of interpreting the results obtained from the estimation of 
this system.  The main difficulty stems from the fact that the social security law requires 
individuals to make contributions not only to the retirement system (at 10% of wages), 
but also to the health system (7%) and to a mandated life insurance program (3%).  Total 
contributions for this “package,” then, stand at 20% of wages.  This means that the 
estimated value of parameter γ is in the range of zero to – 20%.   
  In the wage equation (18) the dependent variable is the log of net (take-home) 
wages; the notation used for the independent variables is provided in Table 3.  We control 
for the usual variables that explain wage differentials, including schooling, experience 
(which, as customary, we proxy by age), experience squared, geographical location of the 
job, gender of the individual, and size of the firm where the individual is employed.   The 
variable Contri is the endogenous dummy variable that indicates if the individual makes 
contributions to the system.  In the estimation of equation (19) we assume that the 
decision on whether to make a contribution depends on schooling, age, industry where 
the individual is employed, size of the firm, gender, and whether the individual in 
question has a formal employment contract.  Our data set consists of 23,198 civilian 
workers in the urban sector, that held a paying job, and did not receive retirement benefits 
at the time of the survey.  Our sample excludes individuals with a household income  28
below the indigent poverty line – or “extreme poverty line --, as well as those with a 
salary that exceed the maximum subject to social security contributions.    
The results obtained from the joint estimation, using a maximum likelihood 
procedure, of the model given by equations (18) - (20 ) are presented in Table 2.  The 
Wald test statistic for independence of the two equations (for the covariance term ρ being 
equal to zero) is equal to 111, strongly suggesting that both equations should indeed be 
estimated jointly.  Panel A in table 2 corresponds to the wage equation (18), while Panel 
B contains the results for “treatment” equation (20).  As may be seen from Table 2-A, the 
estimated coefficients for the traditional variables – schooling, experience and 
experienced squared – are along the line of what is expected, and are consistent with 
previous estimates for Chile and other emerging economies.  Both schooling and 
experience have significant and positive coefficients; as expected, experience squared has 
a negative and significant coefficient.  Women earn significantly less than men, and there 
are regional and firm size significant wage differentials.  The most important result, for 
our purpose, is that the estimated coefficient of the social security contribution variable is 
significantly negative, as expected.  Its point estimate –0.0885 suggests that, on average 
and for equivalent jobs, individuals that contribute to the social security (cum health) 
system have a take-home wage that is almost 9% lower than those that do not contribute 
to the system.  Since the mandatory (for retirement and health) contribution is 20%, this 
means that individuals that make contributions consider part of them as taxes.  More 
specifically, these results suggest that individuals consider little over one half of their 
contribution to be a tax.  29
A few words on the results from the treatment equation (Panel B in Table 2): the 
decision to contribute to the social security system is affected in a positive way by 
schooling, experience (although at a declining rate), and the size of the firm.  Women 
tend to contribute less than men, and part time workers tend to contribute less than those 
that work full time.  Naturally, and as expected, those that have an employment contract 
(dcontra) have a (very) high probability of contributing.  Some of the sectoral variables 
are also significant, suggesting that with other things given, the probability of making 
contributions to the private social security system is affected by type of industry where 
the individual works.  
In order to investigate for the robustness of the results reported in Table 2, we 
estimated earnings equations for alternative samples.  The results obtained from these 
alternative estimations confirmed those reported in Table 2, and are not presented here 
due to space considerations.  In section V of this paper we use the estimates reported in 
Table 2 as am input into our simulation exercises. 
 
V.  Chile’s Pension Reform and The Labor Market 
In this section we present the results from simulation exercises, based on the 
model derived in section III, on the effects of the social security reform on Chile’s labor 
market.  We proceed as follows:  We use values for the key parameters from previous 
studies of the Chilean economy, as well as from the econometric results presented in the 
previous section to provide a “base case” calibration of the model.  In order to test for the 
robustness of the results, we then consider alternative values for the key parameters.  This  30
procedure allows us to obtain a range of estimates for the effects of the social security 
reform on Chile’s labor market variables.    
In Table 4 we present the values of the parameters used in the simulation exercise.  
The elasticities were taken from previous studies on the Chilean economy.
30  The data on 
the labor force and the rate of unemployment were taken from Banco Central de Chile.  
The percentage of workers in the informal sector was taken from the analysis reported in 
section IV of this paper.  The parameter for µ was taken from a number of studies on 
Chile’s inflation.  In our base case analysis we assume that under the traditional pay-as-
you-go system, contributions to the social security system (at an average rate of 26% of 
wages) were fully considered to be a tax; as pointed out above, benefits during the pre-
reform era were considered to be an entitlement.  Finally, we assumed that in the post 
reform period, mandated contributions to the pension system had a tax component equal 
to 5.6% of wages.  That is, we assume that individuals considered that slightly over one 
half of the required contribution to the pension fund constituted a tax.  This figure is 
based on the econometric results reported in the preceding section.  More specifically, it 
was obtained by assuming that the perceived tax element of the contributions is equally 
distributed between the retirement component and the health component.
31  
In Table 5 we present the simulation results for the case where the reform reduces 
the (implicit) tax on labor, but where there is no increase in the take-home pay for those 
enrolled in the system.  These results were obtained after calibrating equations (12) and 
(14) in Section III.  Table 6, on the other hand, contains the results from a simulation 
exercise that assumes that the reform results in a 10% increase in net take-home pay for 
those enrolled in the system, and correspond to equations (16) and (17).  In both tables  31
we have presented a “low” and a “high” case scenario.  As may be seen, these results 
suggest that, by reducing the implicit tax on labor, Chile’s pension reform had a positive 
(but small) effect on wages in the informal sector, at the same time as it contributed to a 
reduction in the rate of unemployment.  
The results in Table 6, which are based on assumptions that closely capture 
Chile’s experience, suggest that the actual effect of the pension reform on labor market 
outcomes was rather modest with respect to unemployment reduction. According to our 
simulation exercise, in the high case scenario, the reforms only contributed 1.0 
percentage points to the reduction of the rate of unemployment.  The total effect on net 
wages was more important, however: first, according to this simulation exercise the 
reform contributed to an increase in net wages in the informal sector that ranged from 1.7 
to 2.1percent.  Second, by design of the reform package net (take home) wages in the 
formal sector increased by 10%.
32   
An important question is how sensitive are these results to the assumption that 
labor market participants considered that under the old system the tax equivalent of 
contributions was 26% of wages, while under the privatized system it was 5.6% of 
wages.  In order to deal with this issue we performed a series of simulation exercises, 
under alternative values of the perceived tax component of contributions, both before and 
after the reform.  More specifically, we made the following alternative assumptions:  (a) 
We assumed that under the old pay-as-you-go regime, half of the contribution was 
considered a tax (T1 = 13%).  (b) With respect to the post-reform era, we considered a 
range of values for the tax component of contributions.  These values go from an 
estimated tax (T2) of 6.2% of wages, to 4.9% of wages.
33  The results obtained under  32
these alternative parameter values are close to those reported in Table 6.  More 
specifically, this sensitivity analysis suggests the following lower bound for the estimated 
effects of Chile’s social security reform:  an increase in informal sector wages of 1.4%, 
and a reduction in unemployment of 0.4 percentage points. 
 
VI. Concluding  Remarks 
In 1981, Chile reformed its social security system.  An inefficient and insolvent 
pay-as-you-go regime was replaced by system based on individual retirement accounts.   
Over the years Chile’s reform has been widely praised, and has been carefully studied by 
policy makers throughout the world.  In this paper we have focused on a neglected aspect 
of Chile’s social security reform: its impact on labor market outcomes, including 
unemployment and wages.  We develop a model of the labor market where we assume 
that, as is the case in most emerging markets, a formal and an informal sectors coexist 
side by side.  According to our model, a social security reform that reduces the implicit 
tax on labor in the formal sector – as was the case in Chile --, will result in an increase in 
the wage rate in the informal sector.  The effect of this type of reform on aggregate 
unemployment is undetermined, however.  Results from simulation exercises suggest that 
in the case of Chile the reforms resulted in a rather modest increase in informal sector 
wages: approximately 2%.  These results from the simulation exercise also suggest that 
the reforms made a positive, but modest, contribution to the reduction of Chile’s 





























































  Table 1: Coverage of Chile’s Social Security System, 1994:  
Urban and rural, by age and gender* 
 
            A.  URBAN 
  16 to 39 
years 





URBAN      
Males      
AFP 68.87 60.01  35.02  63.36 
Other 3.09 9.84  18.95  6.58 
No 28 30.15  46.04  30.03 
no answer  0.04 0  0  0.02 
Total 100 100  100  100 
 
URBAN 
   
Females      
AFP 66.56 52.89  24.57  59.63 
Other 2.46 9.27  16.72  5.57 
No 30.98 37.6  58.71  34.72 
no answer  0 0.24  0  0.08 
Total 100 100  100  100 
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B.  RURAL     
Males             
AFP 44.85 39.12  21.02  40.79 
Other 2.65 11.33  13.47  6.41 
No 52.49 49.56  65.51  52.8 
No answer  0.01 0  0  0.01 
Total 100 100  100  100 
 
RURAL 
   
Females      
AFP 48.79 41.69  17.83  44.93 
Other 1.59 6.25  13.63  3.64 
No 49.62 52.06  68.54  51.44 
Total 100 100  100  100 
  *     Totals may no add up to 100 due to rounding errors. 
                    Source: calculated by the authors using raw data from Casen 94  37
TABLE 2 
Wages and Social Security Contributions 
 (Maximum Likelihood Simultaneous Estimation)  
A. Wage  Equation 
 




| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
-------------+-------------------------------------------
yschool | .079173 .0010154 77.97 0.000
ex | .0217501 .0007858 27.68 0.000
ex2 | -.0001781 .0000159 -11.20 0.000
woman | -.1636414 .0066837 -24.48 0.000
REGION1 | .0479687 .0116115 4.13 0.000
REGION2 | -.0120154 .0125271 -0.96 0.337
REGION3 | -.0427694 .0129711 -3.30 0.001
FIRM6_9 | .0166319 .0132469 1.26 0.209
FIRM10_49 | .0554989 .0089351 6.21 0.000
FIRM50_199 | .1193046 .0105452 11.31 0.000
FIRM_200 | .2371546 .0107323 22.10 0.000
Contri | -.0885305 .0129523 -6.84 0.000
_cons | 10.45468 .019303 541.61 0.000
-------------+--------------------------------------------
B. Treatment  Equation 
 
(Dependent variable:  Dummy for social security contributions) 
---------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
-------------+-------------------------------------------
yschool | .0359285 .0037132 9.68 0.000
age | .0356025 .0059522 5.98 0.000 38
(Table 2, continuation)
---------------------------------------------------------
age2 | -.0003571 .0000723 -4.94 0.000
FIRM6_9 | .0849724 .0483861 1.76 0.079
FIRM10_49 | .3225233 .0344014 9.38 0.000
FIRM50_199 | .4179108 .0455909 9.17 0.000
FIRM_200| .5256829 .0514504 10.22 0.000
part_ti | -.2436089 .0600502 -4.06 0.000
woman | -.1087624 .0288949 -3.76 0.000
AGRI | .2301454 .1331833 1.73 0.084
MINI | .286353 .1472251 1.95 0.052
INDU | .2978188 .1297052 2.30 0.022
UTIL | .2220377 .1905074 1.17 0.244
CONS | .2163195 .1317592 1.64 0.101
COMM | .2355087 .128338 1.84 0.066
TRAN | .1413476 .1317512 1.07 0.283
FINA | .4103262 .139452 2.94 0.003
GOV | .2871577 .1284112 2.24 0.025
dcontract | 1.93364 .0283869 68.12 0.000
_cons | -1.841414 .1741268 -10.58 0.000
-------------+--------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------
Number of obs = 23198
Wald chi2(12) = 7967.36
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -21518.074
Wald test of indep. eqns.
(rho = 0): chi2(1)= 110.95;
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 39
 
Table 3: Notation Used in Estimation of Treatment Model  
 
  
yschool  Years of schooling 
ex (age)  Experience measured by age 
exp2 (age2)  Experience (age) squared 







FINA Financial  services 
GOV Government   
REGi  Regional dummies  (i=1..3 ).  REG1 refers to the two largest 
metropolitan areas. 
Contri  Dummy that takes value of one if the individula has made a 
contribution to the socila security system 
FIRMj_k  Dummy that takes value of one if the firm where the 
individual is employed has j to k workers.  FIRM_200 refers 
to firms with 200 or more workers.  40
Part_ti  Dummy that takes value of one if individual works part time  
dcontract  Dummy that takes the value of one if the individual has an 
employment contract 
Woman  Dummy that takes a value of one if the individual is a woman 
  
  41











































Wage “passover coefficient” in prices in  
Informal sector goods 
 





Supply elasticity of labor with respect to 
wages 
   





Weight of informal sector prices in price level 
 





Demand elasticity for labor in informal sector 
 





Demand elasticity for labor in modern sector 
 





Initial implicit tax on labor 
 





Post reform implicit tax on labor 
  
      5.6 % 
 





TABLE 5:   
Chile’s Pension Reform and the Labor Market: 
Simulation Results 
a 







Low Case Scenario 
 
High Case Scenario 
 
Percentage change in real 
















- 1.5 % 
 
 
- 2.1 % 
a:  This exercise assumes that there is no change in the net take-home pay for those in the 
“formal” segment of the labor market. 
 








TABLE 6:   
Chile’s Pension Reform and the Labor Market: 
Simulation Results 
a 







Low Case Scenario 
 
High Case Scenario 
 
Percentage change in real 
















- 0.7 % 
 
 
- 1.0 % 
a:  This exercise assumes that, at the time of the reform, there is a 10% increase in the net 
take-home pay for those in the “formal” segment of the labor market. 
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